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Abstract	  
	  
Recent spikes in oil prices have thrown light on how economic activity in emerging markets may 
be impacted by oil price shocks. This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the effect of oil 
price shocks on emerging markets. It tests for the existence of an asymmetrical relationship 
between oil prices and economic activity using a model developed by James Hamilton. It also 
assesses the impact of structural shocks to the real price of oil on output as proposed by Lutz 
Kilian. While our models find no consistent pattern within emerging markets, they do suggest 
that oil price shocks have a greater significance in 2000-2009 than in the full sample of 1974-
2009. We also find that emerging economies are impacted by changes in oil specific demand but 
unaffected by changes in aggregate demand for industrial commodities.  
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1.	  Introduction	  
In the last four years, oil prices has gone from $60 in March 2007 to $145 in July 
2008, fallen back to $40 in March 2009, and risen once again to $110 in April 20111. The 
first increase preceded the global recession, and the second may derail the recent recovery. 
This relationship between oil prices and the macroeconomy has been observed for all but 
one recession since 1950(Hamilton 1983). Changes in oil prices can affect the economy 
through multiple channels. These include a rise in the costs of production, a rise in 
inflation, uncertainty regarding investment, or a transfer of wealth from oil exporting 
countries to oil exporting countries.  
Researchers have applied various linear and nonlinear methodologies to capture the 
magnitude and direction of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship but have mostly 
limited their study to advanced economies. From 2008 onwards, annual oil consumption in 
emerging markets has exceeded annual oil consumption in the United States2. The dual 
issues of increasing oil demand from developing countries along with depletion in oil 
supplies make the study of oil prices and emerging economies highly pertinent. This paper 
extends the approaches pioneered by James Hamilton and Lutz Kilian in the study of oil 
prices and their impact on output to emerging markets. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a review of the existing literature on the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship. Section 3 presents the main features and trends of the oil price market and 
emerging market economies. Section 4 and 5 cover the empirical analysis and Section 6 
provides some concluding remarks.  
2.	  Literature	  Review	  
The study of oil shocks and the macroeconomy was pioneered by Hamilton during 
the 1980s, a period that was preceded by large increases in oil prices. In his study, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Source:	  U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration	  2	  Emerging	  markets	  consists	  of	  Brazil,	  India,	  China,	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Source:	  U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration	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Hamilton found that most recessions in the US prior to 1972 were preceded by increases in 
oil prices by about ¾ of a year. He presented three hypotheses as explanations for this 
phenomenon – i) The correlations represent historical coincidence, ii) Correlations result 
from existence of endogenous explanatory variable that affects both series, and iii) At least 
some of the recessions in the US are caused by exogenous increases in oil shocks. His 
model rejected the first two hypotheses but was unable to reject the third statement. 
Hamilton found that 1948 – 1980 was characterized by a statistically significant 
relationship between oil prices and real US Gross National Product.  
Mork (1989) extended Hamilton’s analysis to the 1980s, a period characterized by a 
collapse in oil prices, and found that the relationship between oil prices and output was 
considerably weaker. However, if positive and negative movements in oil prices were 
treated as separate variables, the former continued to be statistically significant. This 
suggested that oil prices and output are characterized by an asymmetric relationship where 
oil price decreases do not have an expansionary effect on economic activity, and may even 
have a contractionary effect. Hooker (1996) also found that the relationship between output 
and oil prices had weakened in the 1980s. His results showed that oil prices failed to 
Granger-cause most economic variables, including GDP, when looking at the period from 
1973 – 1995. Even after correcting for the asymmetric relationship between oil prices and 
output, the former failed to Granger-cause the latter.  
Hamilton (1996) responded to this research by accepting its findings but disagreeing 
with Hooker’s and Mork’s treatment of shocks to oil prices. He argued that since most of 
oil price increases since 1986 had followed even larger decreases, looking at the quarterly 
change in oil prices would imply more oil price volatility then there actually was. Rather, 
he believed that consumers would be affected by yearly changes and thus oil price shocks 
should compare the current price to the price over the previous year. He called this the net 
oil price increase (NOPI), a measure which is extensively used in current research in energy 
economics. Using the NOPI, Hamilton found that the relationship between GDP growth 
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and oil prices was not statistically significant during the smaller sample period of 1973 – 
1994 but it was statistically significant during the full sample period from 1948 – 1994. It 
should be noted that despite the statistical insignificance of the former relationship, the 
individual coefficient with the greatest significance was the one relating GDP growth to the 
net oil price increase four quarters earlier. This result validates Hamilton’s preference for 
yearly over quarterly changes in oil prices. 
Mork’s observations on the asymmetrical relationship between oil prices and output 
were followed by several studies that tried to explain this puzzle. Hamilton proposed that 
the asymmetry existed due to uncertainty in the price and supply of energy which caused 
individuals and firms to postpone their investment decisions. This mechanism implied that 
an oil price decrease would not have the mirror effect of an oil price increase. Ferderer 
(1996) expanded on Hamilton’s mechanism and found that oil price shocks affected 
economic activity through uncertainty channels and sectoral shocks. These mechanisms 
suggest that oil price changes affect the prices of goods in energy-intensive industries, such 
as consumer durables, by changing cost structures which further affects the demand for 
these goods. The reduction in demand due to uncertainty in oil prices creates a surplus of 
labor and capital in energy-intensive sectors. Since it is costly to shift specialized labor and 
capital between sectors, changes in oil prices would cause unemployment in the negatively 
affected sectors. These channels had been previously examined by Hamilton (1983; 1996) 
and Bernanke (1983) and were accepted as one of explanations for the persistence in oil 
shocks. 
The 2000 boom in oil prices and the 2003 Iraq War set the stage for further 
discussion on the relationship between oil prices and output. Barsky and Kilian (2004) 
claimed that recent movements in oil prices could not be treated as exogenous shocks and 
that earlier models suffered from endogeneity. They challenged the uncertainty and sectoral 
shifts channel on the grounds that the drops in purchases of consumer durables after the 
shocks of 1974, 1979, and 1990 were rather small by historical standards and that the 
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decline began before the event associated with the oil shock. This evidence weakened the 
argument that oil prices affected economic activity through a reduction in the demand for 
durables. Barsky and Kilian further went on to say that events in the Middle East did not 
play as prominent a role in determining oil prices as had been previously accepted. They 
claimed that political events in the Middle East resulted in an increase in the precautionary 
demand for oil. This implied that events such as war would results in shifts of the demand 
curve rather than the supply curve. They dispelled the supply shocks model by showing that 
supply cuts of similar magnitude had very different effects on oil prices. Rather, the true 
effect of a supply shock would depend on the response of other suppliers and the overall 
macroeconomy. They highlighted the importance of expectations regarding oil supply 
rather than actual supply itself.  
Kilian (2009) proposed that movement in crude oil prices could be decomposed into 
the following three components – crude oil supply shocks; shocks to the global demand for 
all industrial commodities; and demand shocks specific to the global crude oil market. He 
tested this hypothesis with the help of a structural vector auto regression of the global crude 
oil market which consisted of the real price of oil, the percent change in global crude oil 
production, and an index of real economic activity. His results showed that shocks to 
aggregate demand had persistent and highly significant effects on economic activity and oil 
prices while precautionary demand shocks caused an immediate and persistent rise in oil 
prices. Interestingly, his results showed that supply shocks only resulted in a small increase 
in the real price of oil. These results suggest that the large spikes in oil prices during the 
1970s and 1990s were driven by the effect of political turmoil in the Middle East on 
precautionary demand rather than supply. Hamilton (2009), however, challenges Kilian’s 
assertion that precautionary demand supersedes supply shocks and backs it up by showing 
that U.S. inventories of crude oil and petroleum products (measured as percentage of global 
production) were going down, not up, during the sharpest movements in oil prices. If 
precautionary demand shocks have a significant effect on oil prices, one would expect that 
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inventory levels would rise following an event expected to disrupt oil supply. Hamilton’s 
finding suggests that there may be more to oil price shocks, whether they occur due to 
shifts in supply or precautionary demand, which will only be revealed with future 
movements in oil prices. 
The above debate does reveal one interesting conclusion that is shared by both 
authors- the recent oil price shock of 2007-2008 is attributed to increased economic activity 
combined with stagnating world production. The late 2000s were a period characterized by 
high growth, where world GDP grew by 9.4% in 2004 and 2005 and by 10.1% in 2006 and 
2007(Hamilton 2009). During this period, the share of emerging markets in world GDP 
also grew significantly. This increase was accompanied by a rise in their energy 
consumption which would increase their impact on world energy prices significantly. 
China, alone, had become the third biggest importer of petroleum by 2007. As the energy 
consumption of emerging markets continues to increase, the recent oil shock provides an 
opportunity to study the impact of movements in oil prices on economic activity in these 
markets.  
Previous studies on the impact of oil price shocks on economic activity have 
primarily focused on the US and other developed countries such as the UK, France, 
Germany, Canada, and Italy. Hamilton (1983; 1996), Kilian (2004; 2008), Hooker (1996), 
Mork (1989), and Ghosh, Varvares, and Morley (2009) each provide empirical evidence 
that increases in oil prices have a significant effect on the US economy, even if they differ 
on the magnitude and pattern of the effects. Other researches expanded this research to the 
G-7 countries and members of the OECD. Mork (1994) studied the economic response to 
oil price increases and decreases in seven OECD countries and found that correlations with 
oil price increases and output were negative and significant for most countries whereas 
correlations with oil price decreases were negative but only significant for the US and 
Canada. Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) apply a linear VAR as well as three nonlinear 
approaches to the US, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK and find evidence of nonlinear 
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effects of oil price on real economic activity and inflation. Rodriguez (2008) assesses the 
effect of oil price shocks on the output of the main manufacturing industries in six OECD 
countries and finds that while similarity is maintained in the group for certain industries 
such as machinery and equipment, it does not exist for industries such as wood and wood 
products.   
There are a small number of studies that have attempted to extend this research to 
developing countries, however, they either focus on a relatively small number of countries 
or do not take recent data into account. Balassa (1985) studies the differences in economic 
growth in 43 developing countries following the 1973 oil shock. He finds that policy 
choices account for a large proportion of the intercountry differences in GNP growth rates 
during the period following the oil shock. Zilberfarb and Adams (1981) focus on the 
income elasticity of energy consumption for developing countries and test the stability of 
the relationship between energy consumption and GDP. They find that the income elasticity 
is about 1.35 and that the relationship has been stable over time period extending from 1970 
– 1976. Other research in the area has focused on specific regions or countries. Cunado and 
Perez de Gracia’s (2005) study of a few Asian countries (Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) reveals that oil price shocks Granger-cause 
economic growth rates in Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. They also find that results 
differ significantly if oil prices are modified by multiplying them with country-specific 
exchange rates. Other studies include an examination of how oil price shocks affected the 
output growth of Turkey (Schubert and Turnovsky 2011) and Middle Eastern and North 
African countries (Berument, Ceylan, and Dogan 2010). 
3.	  Data	  
A survey of the existing oil shock literature reveals a variety of data series and 
methodologies that are employed to test for the impact of oil price shocks on economic 
activity. Our full list of data series can be found in the Appendix in Table 1. Most 
researchers use one of the following two indices as a measure of oil prices - the $US price 
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of oil as measured by the West Texas Intermediate benchmark and the £UK price of oil as 
measured by Brent benchmark. The nominal price of oil may then be deflated using 
relevant consumer price indices or country specific exchange rates. The most commonly 
used proxy for economic activity is gross domestic product at the national level. Alternative 
series include industrial production, output by industry/sector, and non-farm business 
output.  
3.1.	  Identifying	  the	  Real	  Price	  of	  Oil	  
This paper uses the $US refiner acquisition cost for crude oil obtained from the US 
Department of Energy (DOE) as a measure of oil prices and deflates it using the US CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) to obtain the real price of oil. This series has been used previously 
by Hamilton (1996), Hooker (1996), and Kilian (2009) in their studies of the impact of oil 
shocks on economic activity. World oil production data is also sourced from the US DOE.  
3.1.1.	  Trends	  in	  the	  Real	  Price	  of	  Oil	  
The volatility of oil prices in the recent decade is reminiscent of the oil shocks during 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Although the recent oil shocks match those of the 1970s in real 
terms, they are significantly larger in nominal prices. Figure 1 illustrates the movements in 
the nominal and the real price of oil while Figure 2 illustrates trends in world oil 
production.  
During the early to mid-1900s, real oil prices were largely stagnant and hovered 
around $20/barrel. The notable events during this period included the Suez crisis in 
November 1956, which caused a drop of 10.1% in crude oil production. The 1970s were 
marked by dramatic increases in oil prices which were driven by shortfalls in supply due to 
the OPEC embargo placed on Western countries in 1967 followed by the Arab-Israel War 
in 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1978. These events caused drops of 7.8% and 8.9% 
in world crude oil production respectively. Prices rose again in 1980 as a result of the Iran-
Iraq war which caused production to fall by 7.2%. The high fuel prices of the 1970s slowed 
economic activity in many countries and led others to conserve energy. This led to an 
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oversupply of oil during the 1980s, which caused a significant decline in world oil prices. 
The next oil shock came in 1990 due to the Persian Gulf War which caused production to 
fall by 8.8%. The 1997 crisis in East Asia reduced demand for crude oil which led to a 
temporary decline in prices, however, the decline was soon reversed in the 2000s.  
The oil price increases in the past decade differed from earlier movements in that they 
were not driven by supply disruptions. Rather they were driven by a variety of factors 
which include rising demand from developing countries and slowdowns in oil supply 
growth. The slowdown in oil supply growth began when oil production surpassed new 
discoveries. The expected future decrease in oil supplies is the fundamental long-term 
cause behind rising oil prices. Speculation on oil price futures also played a significant role 
in driving nominal oil prices well above $100 in 2007 and 2008. The financial crisis and the 
ensuing recession caused oil prices to fall from their record high; however, the past few 
months have seen a surge in oil prices due to the tensions in the Middle East. It is unclear 
how oil prices may move as the Middle Eastern situation remains tense and concerns about 
long term oil supply depletion become larger.     
3.2.	  Identifying	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  Emerging	  Markets	  
This paper employs two distinct series to measure the level of economic activity. On 
a national level, we use the real gross domestic product (GDP) obtained at a quarterly 
frequency from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. To identify 
countries in emerging markets, we use the countries identified as ‘emerging’ by the S&P 
Emerging Markets Index. We also limit our study to countries that have quarterly real GDP 
data available for a minimum of 48 quarters. This ensures that we can capture the effect of 
the recent oil price shocks and that our regressions have sufficient degrees of freedom. The 
full list of countries and data availability for each country can be found in Table 2. At the 
global level, we use the demand for industrial commodities in world markets as measured 
by the Baltic Dry Exchange Index, which is a composite series of world ocean freight rates. 
We deflate the index using US CPI. The nominal and real Index are depicted in Figure 3. 
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The positive correlation between ocean freight rates and economic activity has been 
previously documented by Isserlis(1938), Tinbergen(1959), and Stopford(1997). Kilian 
(2009) proposes that demand for transport services is mostly driven by changes in global 
economic activity. Changes in freight rates reflect the changes in demand for transport 
services and thereby changes in the level of world economic activity. While the correlation 
may not be perfect, it serves as a proxy for demand for industrial commodities, which are 
mostly shipped by sea. Alternatives like industrial production and gross domestic product 
are not available at such a high frequency and are not available for all countries.  
3.2.1.	  Summary	  Statistics	  for	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  in	  Emerging	  Markets	  
Before we examine the oil price-macroeconomy relationship, it may be useful to 
survey trends in economic activity in emerging markets. Table 3 provides statistics on 
economic growth, sectoral composition, and net imports of oil in emerging economies.  
Economic growth in emerging markets has been well above world averages in the last 
decade. From 1992 to 2001, emerging markets grew at 3.8% annually compared to a 2.8% 
annual growth in advanced economies. The gap widened in the 2000s and reached its 
maximum in 2007 at 5.5 percentage points. The divergence in growth rates became 
particularly apparent during the credit crisis in 2009 when advanced economies contracted 
by 3.2% while emerging markets grew by 2.4%. The World Bank’s forecasts indicate that 
the gap will continue to persist through 2015 as emerging markets are forecast to grow at 
6.7% while advanced economies are forecast to grow at 2.3%. 
A look at sectoral composition reveals that emerging markets are more dependent on 
agriculture than the rest of the world. While the world average for contribution of 
agriculture to GDP is 5.7%, most emerging economies earn more than 7% of gross 
domestic product from agriculture, with some relying on it for more than 10% of output. 
The breakup between industry and services for the world is 30.7% and 63.6% respectively. 
This is not too different from emerging economies which have an average of 33% and 59% 
respectively. 
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The growing demand for energy in emerging markets has been identified as one of 
the leading causes behind the run up in prices in 2007 and 2008. Most emerging economies 
are net importers of oil with the exception of Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Russia. While oil supplies from South America still look promising, Malaysia’s net 
exporter position has been diminishing over the past few years. The growing need for oil in 
emerging economies becomes apparent when one considers that oil consumption in 
emerging markets has exceeded oil consumption in the United States since 2008.  
4.	  Methodology	  
Previous studies on the impact of oil shocks on emerging markets have employed 
many different methods to model oil price shocks. The important debates on methodology 
are centered on two issues – asymmetry in the relationship between oil prices and economic 
activity, and the exogenous nature of oil shocks. Some researchers have identified an 
asymmetrical relationship between oil prices and economic activity and thus define oil 
price shocks as positive movements in oil prices (Hooker 1996; Hamilton 1996). Others 
have treated oil price increases and decreases as separate variables (Mork 1989). Yet others 
do not address this issue and treat all movements in oil prices similarly (Jimenez-Rodriguez 
2008).  
The second debate concerns the exogeneity of oil price shocks. While oil shocks prior 
to 1980 were directly linked to political events in the Middle East, recent movements in oil 
prices in recent years have been significantly affected by domestic economic activity, 
foreign economic activity, interest rates, and core inflation. Hamilton(1996), Hooker(1996), 
and Mork(1989) estimate regressions with GDP growth as the dependent variable and 
lagged values of GDP growth and oil price shock measures as explanatory variables. 
Barsky and Kilian(2004) were among the first to draw attention to the possibility of 
endogeneity in the relationship between oil prices and economic activity. To correct for this 
endogeneity, Kilian(2009) proposed that changes in oil prices could be decomposed into 
three components – precautionary demand, supply, and aggregate demand. He carried out 
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this decomposition through a VAR model consisting of real oil prices, world oil production, 
and global economic activity. This model has gained favor in recent years and has been 
modified to include the effect of interest rates, inflation, and foreign trade (Ghosh, 
Varvares, and Morley 2009). 
4.1.	  Modeling	  Net	  Oil	  Price	  Increases	  
This paper will employ two separate models to test if oil prices have a significant 
effect on economic activity in emerging markets. The first model is similar to the one 
employed by Hamilton (1996). It allows for asymmetry in the relationship between oil 
prices and economic activity and treats oil shocks as exogenous. For each country, we 
estimate the following regression: 
∆ y! = !! +    !!!∆!!!! + !!!!!!!#!!!!!!!!                                         (1) 
In equation (1), !! is log levels of real GDP and !#is the net oil price increase (NOPI) 
as defined by Hamilton (1996). As specified by Hamilton, we include four lags each of real 
GDP growth and net oil price increases. The NOPI is computed as shown below: !"#$ = max 0, !" !"!! − !" !"# !"!!!!,… , !"!!!!"                             (2) 
The NOPI compares the real price of oil each quarter with the maximum value 
observed during the preceding twelve quarters. If the value for the current quarter exceeds 
the previous three years’ maximum, the percentage change over the previous maximum is 
plotted. If the value does not exceed the previous three years’ maximum, the series is 
defined as zero for that quarter. The historical evolution of oil price shocks as implied by 
the NOPI is plotted in Figure 4. 
By regressing country level GDP on seasonal dummies, we find strong evidence of 
seasonal trends in the data. To correct for this, we modify Hamilton’s model to include 
seasonal dummies. After adjusting for seasonal trends, the model has the following 
specification:  
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∆ y! = !! +    !!!∆!!!! + !!!!!!!#!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!!!!!!                                 (3) 
In equation (3),!!, !!, and !! are seasonal dummies that control for seasonal cycles in 
real GDP of each country. While the addition of seasonal dummies does reduce the degrees 
of freedom, it ensures that the regression coefficients are capturing the appropriate 
movements in real GDP.  
4.2.	  Decomposing	  the	  Real	  Price	  of	  Oil	  and	  Modeling	  Structural	  Shocks	  
The second model is similar to the approach employed by Kilian (2009). This model 
does not account for asymmetry in the relationship between oil prices and economic 
activity and treats oil shocks as endogenous. Following Kilian’s approach, we first 
decompose the real price of oil into its three components – precautionary demand, supply, 
and aggregate demand. In order to do so, we carry out the following VAR: 
!!!! = ! + !!!!!!!"!!! + !!                                                              (4) 
In equation (4), !! = (∆!"#$, !"!! , !"!!)′ where ∆!"#!! is the percent change in 
global crude oil production, !"!!  denotes the index of real economic activity as measured 
by the deflated Baltic Dry Index, and !"!! refers to the real price of oil. All three series are 
collected at the monthly frequency and the lag length of the VAR is twenty four. The !"!! 
and !"!! series are expressed in logs. !! denotes the vector of serially and mutually 
uncorrelated structural innovations. The VAR is used to identify the structural shocks to the 
global crude oil market. The residuals from this multivariate VAR form the following three 
series – oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and precautionary demand shock. Oil 
supply shocks are defined as exogenous shocks to global oil production. Aggregate demand 
shocks are changes in global real economic activity that cannot be explained by crude oil 
supply shocks. Finally, precautionary demand shocks are changes in the real price of oil 
that reflect changes in the demand for oil rather than demand for industrial commodities or 
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supply of crude oil. Oil specific demand shocks may arise due to uncertainty about future 
oil supply or reflect changes in speculative demand. Since these shocks are obtained at the 
monthly frequency, we take three month averages to obtain quarterly series. Figure 5 plots 
the historical evolution of these structural shocks as implied by our model.  
Kilian(2009) hypothesizes that the relationship between economic activity and 
changes in oil prices depends on the cause of the change in the latter, whether it be 
disruptions in oil supply, surge in global demand for commodities or speculation about 
future movements in oil prices. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate the following 
regression for each country: 
∆!! = !! + !!"!!"!!!"!!! + !!" ,      ! = 1,2,3                                (5)  
In equation (5), !! is log levels of real GDP, !!" , ! = 1,2,3 represents the three shocks - oil 
supply, aggregate demand, and precautionary demand. All three shocks are entered with 
twelve lags to maintain similarity to Kilian’s specification. We run this regression equation 
by equation to make it more parsimonious. Although this may result in omitted variable 
bias, the effect would be minimal since the structural shocks are obtained from residuals 
that are orthogonal by design. To correct for seasonal trends previously identified in real 
GDP, we modify Kilian’s model by adding seasonal dummies to equation (5). After 
adjusting for seasonal trends, the model has the following specification: 
∆!! = !! + !!"!!"!!!"!!! + !!" + !!!" + !!!" + !!!" ,      ! = 1,2,3                                (6) 
The results of both models are analyzed at the country level and the regional level as 
well as modified to include volatility in oil prices in the following section. 
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5.	  Results	  
In this section, we discuss the estimation results for our models and compare their 
findings. To analyze the effect of movements in oil prices on economic activity in emerging 
markets, we conduct F-tests for each country to determine if the parameters relating oil 
price variables to real GDP growth are statistically significant as a group. The results are 
presented in the form of p-values, in other words the probability of observing the actual or a 
higher F-value under the respective null hypotheses.  
Table 4 presents the results for the F-tests of the net oil price increase model. We 
separate the results by region to ease analysis. Hamilton’s study of the relationship between 
oil shocks and US GDP revealed that it would lose significance during a period of 
decreases in oil prices or a lack of net oil price increases. He found that although the 
parameters relating net oil price increases to GDP growth were statistically significant as a 
group during the period 1948:I to 1994:II, they lost their significance during the period 
1973:IV to 1994:II(Hamilton 1996). While we cannot perform this exact test since data on 
emerging markets is not available prior to the 1980s with the exception of Korea and Israel, 
we perform a similar test for emerging markets by comparing statistical significance during 
the full sample and the period from 2000:I – 2009:IV. The full sample, if available, 
includes the late 1980s and the 1990s, which did not exhibit much movement in oil prices 
with the exception of the 1990 oil shock. The results of the regression with the full sample 
are reported by region in the first column of Table 4. The restricted sample is characterized 
by sharp increases in oil prices as well as the oil shock of 2007-2008, which makes it 
similar to the 1970s. The results of the regression with the restricted sample are reported in 
the second column of Table 4.  
Seasonal dummies were included in both models to adjust for the seasonal trend in 
real GDP. While seasonally adjusted data is available for the US, such series are lacking for 
emerging market countries. Using seasonal dummies is a crude form of carrying out the 
required seasonal adjustment. The danger with using seasonally unadjusted data is that it 
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may result in spurious correlation between oil prices and economic activity.  The third 
column of Table 4 reports results of the regression with seasonal adjustments.  
Table 5 presents the results for the F-tests of the structural shock model. We extend 
Hamilton’s hypothesis to Kilian’s model and run separate regressions for the period from 
2000:I to 2009:IV. If Hamilton’s hypothesis is correct, the presence of large oil shocks in 
this later period should affect the significance of one or more of the structural shocks, 
depending on the cause of the rise in oil prices in the recent decade. If the rise in oil prices 
was driven by a surge in economic activity, as has been proposed by Hamilton and Kilian, 
aggregate demand should acquire more statistical significance during the later period. The 
results for the full sample are reported in the first column of Table 5 while the results of the 
regression with the restricted sample are reported in the second column of Table 5. The 
third column of Table 5 reports results of the regression with seasonal adjustments. 
5.1.	  Empirical	  Results	  for	  the	  Net	  Oil	  Price	  Increase	  Model	  
5.1.1.	  Asia	  	  
 The regressions results from the net oil price increases model vary greatly within 
each region. For Asia, the relation between real GDP growth and net oil price increase for 
the full sample is only significant for Korea. Unlike other Asian countries, quarterly real 
GDP data is available for Korea since 1960. This allows the model to capture the shocks in 
1970s as well as the late 2000s. All other countries have quarterly data beginning in the late 
1980s or early 1990s. The inclusion of the 1970s shocks probably strengthens the 
relationship between Korean real GDP and oil prices. When the sample is restricted to 
2000:I – 2009:IV, the relation between real GDP growth and oil price shocks also becomes 
significant for Malaysia and Thailand at the 10% and 5% significance level respectively. 
The change in significance confirms Hamilton’s hypothesis since net oil price increases and 
its lags become jointly significant for more countries when the period with stagnant oil 
prices is removed from the sample. The p-value for Malaysia falls from 0.201 to 0.073. 
This reduction could also be attributed to Malaysia’s change in net exports which have 
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fallen from their 1989 peak of almost 400,000 barrels/day to less than 150,000 barrels/day 
in 20093. The change in its net exports position implies that its domestic oil consumption is 
rising faster than its oil production. As Malaysia increases its oil consumption, its 
vulnerability to changes in the price of oil will also increase. The relation is insignificant 
for Indonesia and Philippines in both samples, however the p-value does decrease for both 
countries when the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV. Although Indonesia has 
recently become a net oil importer, it was a net exporter for several decades prior4. This 
could explain the lack of statistical significance in the relationship between oil prices and 
real GDP growth for Indonesia. This is also consistent with the finding that it is easier to 
reject the null hypothesis that oil prices do not affect real GDP growth in Indonesia in the 
later period than in the full sample.  
We find that the addition of seasonal dummies has a significant effect on the relation 
between oil prices and economic activity. The p-value for all Asian countries rises when 
seasonal dummies are included. The relation between real GDP growth and net oil price 
increases only remains significant for Korea. This indicates that the original regression 
results were partly motivated by a spurious correlation between oil prices and real GDP 
growth.   
5.1.2.	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  
For Central and South America, the parameters relating net oil price increases to real 
GDP growth are not statistically significant as a group for any country in the full sample. 
When the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV, the p-value falls for all countries and 
the relationship becomes statistically significant for Chile and Peru at the 5% significance 
level. The lack of statistical significance of net oil price increases for Argentina, Brazil, and 
Colombia is expected since these countries are net oil exporters. Oil price shocks would 
have a positive effect on the energy industry while having the opposite effect on all other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Source:	  U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration	  –	  Country	  Profile:	  Malaysia	  	  4	  Source:	  U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration	  –	  Country	  Profile:	  Indonesia	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industries that now face higher costs. The net effect on a net exporter would depend on the 
contribution of energy industries to total GDP.   
The addition of seasonal dummies has a mixed effect on the statistical significance of 
net oil price increases and its lags. While the p-value rises for Chile and falls for Brazil, the 
p-values for Argentina, Colombia, and Peru are not affected greatly. The change in Chile’s 
p-value could imply that seasonal trends were creating spurious correlation between net oil 
price increases and real GDP growth. The change in Brazil’s p-value implies the opposite – 
seasonal trends were reducing genuine correlation between net oil price increases and real 
GDP growth. 
5.1.3.	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  
For Central and Eastern Europe, the parameters relating net oil price increases to real 
GDP growth are statistically significant as a group for Hungary in the full sample but 
insignificant for all other countries. When the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV, the 
p-values fall for most countries and the relationship becomes statistically significant for 
Hungary and Turkey at the 10% significance level. The lack of statistical significance for 
Russia is not surprising since its large oil exports buffer it against the negative effects of 
rising oil prices. Its p-value does fall from 0.427 to 0.103 when the sample is restricted to 
2000:I to 2009:IV. This may indicate that Russia’s net export position, which has doubled 
since 1999, is producing large enough gains such that the benefits from oil price shocks 
outweigh the losses. The lack of statistical significance for the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
the Slovak Republic is surprising since these countries are net importers of oil and have 
faced sharp rises in domestic oil consumption in the last decade. 
The addition of seasonal dummies raises the p-value for Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
and Turkey while decreasing the p-value for Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. This 
implies that it is harder to reject the null hypothesis that oil prices do not affect real GDP 
growth for Hungary, Poland, and Russia and easier to reject the null hypothesis that oil 
prices do not affect real GDP growth for Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.  
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5.1.4.	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  
For the Middle East and North Africa, the sample is not representative of the region 
since data is unavailable at the quarterly frequency except for recent years. Of the three 
countries for which data is available, the relationship between net oil price increases and 
real GDP growth is insignificant for the full sample. When the sample is limited to the 
2000:I to 2009:IV, the p-value increases for Israel and Morocco while decreasing for 
Jordan. Like Eastern Europe, the lack of statistical significance is surprising since all three 
countries are net importers of oil and have faced sharp rises in consumption in the last 
decade. The addition of seasonal dummies has little effect on the p-value, implying that 
seasonal trends did not distort the relationship between real GDP growth and net oil price 
increases.  
5.2.	  Empirical	  Results	  for	  the	  Structural	  Shocks	  Model	  
5.2.1	  Asia	  
The regression of real GDP growth on the various components of the real price of oil 
reveals that precautionary demand and its lags have a statistically significant effect on real 
GDP growth at the 5% significance level. This implies that real GDP growth is 
significantly affected by changes in speculative demand for oil and uncertainty in future oil 
supply. When the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV, the F-test for precautionary 
demand and its lags becomes statistically significant for the entire region at the 1% level. 
This can be attributed to the 2007-2008 shock that was associated with high levels of 
speculative demand for oil. 
The F-test for oil supply and its lags is also significant at the 5% significance level for 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. A look at the coefficients of oil supply and its lags 
reveals that they are mostly negative for Malaysia. This implies that despite Malaysia’s net 
exporter position, it is negatively affected by global oil supply shocks. The opposite is true 
for Indonesia. Although the sign on most of its coefficients of oil supply and its lags is also 
negative, they are not jointly significant. This implies that despite its recently acquired net 
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importer position, Indonesia’s energy industry buffered it from the negative impact of 
global oil supply shocks over the full sample. When the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 
2009:IV, the F-test for oil supply shocks and its lags becomes significant at the 5% 
significance level for the entire region. This implies that in recent years, net exporters and 
importers have been affected by global oil supply shocks.  
The F-test for aggregate demand and its lags is not significant for any country except 
Thailand in the full and the restricted sample. Since these are emerging markets, they have 
been growing at rates at significantly higher than developed countries in North America 
and Europe. This could indicate the lack of statistical significance in the relationship 
between domestic GDP for Asian emerging markets and world economic activity. 
The inclusion of seasonal dummies raises p-values for all three shocks for most 
countries sampled in Asia. Precautionary demand only remains statistically significant for 
Korea and the Philippines. Similarly, oil supply shocks only remain significant for Korea. 
Aggregate demand shock remains statistically insignificant except for Thailand and 
Malaysia. The addition of seasonal dummies makes it harder to reject the hypothesis that 
real oil prices do not have a statistically significant effect on economic activity through the 
components of precautionary demand shocks, oil supply shocks, and aggregate demand 
shocks. 
5.2.2.	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  
For Central and South America, precautionary demand shocks and its lags are jointly 
significant for Argentina, Chile and Peru and jointly insignificant for Brazil and Colombia. 
When the sample is restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV, precautionary demand shocks and its 
lags are jointly significant for all countries. This is similar to the pattern exhibited in Asia 
and could be attributed to the 2007-2008 oil shock that has a prominent effect on the later 
sample.  
The F-test for oil supply shocks and its lags is statistically significant for all countries 
at the 5% significance level except Colombia. This pattern persists even when the sample is 
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restricted to 2000:I to 2009:IV. The lack of statistical significance in the relationship 
between oil supply shocks and economic activity in Colombia could be due to the increase 
in its net export position over the recent years. Its oil production is rising faster than 
domestic consumption which could insulate it from any shortfalls of oil supply globally. 
The other net exporters of oil in the region are Argentina and Brazil. While the first is 
facing the opposite problem, the second has only recently become a net exporter of oil and 
is not insulated from oil supply shocks as yet. 
Aggregate demand does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with 
real GDP growth in the region, with the exception of Peru. In the restricted sample, p-
values rise for most countries indicating that the past decade has increased the divergence 
between Central and South America and the rest of the world in terms of economic growth. 
This is consistent with the data on growth rates of real GDP in Latin America and the rest 
of the world. 
The inclusion of seasonal dummies makes it harder to reject the hypothesis that the 
components of the real price of oil do not impact economic activity in Central and South 
America. The p-values rise for all three shocks for almost all the countries, thereby 
indicating that the seasonal trend has created spurious correlation in the original 
regressions.  
5.2.3.	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  
The real price of oil appears to have a statistically significant effect on countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe since all three components – precautionary demand shock, oil 
supply shock, and aggregate demand shock - are statistically significant at the 10% level 
with the exception of Turkey. In the full sample, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
precautionary demand shocks, oil supply shocks, and aggregate demand shocks do not 
affect the economies of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. The statistical 
significance of aggregate demand suggests that growth in Central and Eastern Europe does 
not differ greatly from the rest of the world in the full sample. A look at growth rates of real 
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GDP reveals that Central and Eastern Europe are not growing as fast as other emerging 
markets in Asia and Latin America. This could explain why aggregate demand shocks are 
statistically significant for Central and Eastern Europe but not for other emerging markets.  
Turkey, however, has a statistically significant relationship with oil supply shocks but 
not with precautionary shocks or aggregate demand shocks. This could imply two things – 
the Turkish economy is not affected by speculative demand for oil or uncertainty about 
future oil supplies and that its growth diverges from real GDP growth in the rest of the 
world. A look at real GDP growth in Turkey reveals that it has been growing at a much 
higher rate than the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, which explains the variance in the 
results within the region.  
In the restricted sample from 2000:I to 2009:IV, the same results exist for 
precautionary demand shocks and oil supply shocks. However, aggregate demand loses its 
statistical significance in most countries in the restricted sample. This could indicate that 
the divergence between economic growth in the Eurasian region and the rest of the world 
has increased in the last decade, a pattern that is true of most developing markets. 
The addition of seasonal dummies raises p-values for all the F-tests for each of the 
shocks. Precautionary demand shocks remain significant for Russia and Turkey while 
supply shocks and aggregate demand shocks no longer seem to affect Eurasian economies. 
This is consistent with the pattern displayed in other regions where adjusting for the 
seasonal trend removes what may have been spurious correlation between the variables.  
5.2.4.	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  
 The F-tests for precautionary demand shock and oil supply shock are statistically 
significant at the 10% level for Israel and Jordan in the full as well as the restricted sample. 
The F-test for aggregate demand is statistically insignificant for Israel in both samples and 
for Jordan in the later sample. The p-values are higher in the restricted sample implying that 
economic growth in both countries diverges from the rest of the world in the past decade. 
Morocco, however does not show statistical significance for any of the shocks but displays 
-­‐	  22	  -­‐	  
	  
a similar fall in p-value for the aggregate demand shock from the full to the restricted 
sample.  
The addition of seasonal dummies, like in all other regions, raised p-values for the all 
the F-tests for each of the shocks. Precautionary demand shocks only remain significant for 
Israel while all other shocks are statistically insignificant for all three countries. As 
expected, seasonal trends may indicate correlation where there is none and their removal 
reduces statistical significance for the components of the real price of oil.    
5.3.	  Alternative	  empirical	  analyses	  
5.3.1.	  Oil	  Price	  Volatility	  
The above section focused on the response of growth rates of real GDP to asymmetric 
shocks and structural shocks in the real price of oil. While the models proposed by 
Hamilton and Kilian dominate the literature on oil price shocks, it is useful to expand the 
analysis to consider the effects of oil price volatility. Hamilton(2003) proposed that one of 
the channels through which oil shocks affect economic activity is the deferral of large 
purchases by consumers due to uncertainty about the future price of oil. This uncertainty 
can be measured by the volatility in oil prices since one would expect that a lack of 
information about future prices would increase volatility.  
Ferderer (1996) performed empirical analysis on the relationship between industrial 
production in the United States and oil price volatility, calculated as a moving standard 
deviation. His hypothesis is based on the theoretical work that shows that oil price 
uncertainty might be as important a determinant of economic activity as the level of oil 
prices. He finds that oil price volatility contains information independent of oil price levels 
that is useful in forecasting economic growth.  We perform a similar test using real GDP 
data for emerging markets. We carry out the following regressions for each country: 
∆ y! = !! +    !!!∆!!!! + !!!!"#!!!#!!!!!!!!                   (7) 
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  ∆ y! = !! +    !!!∆!!!! + !!!!!!!#!!!!!!!! + !!!!"#!!!#!!!!                       (8) 
In equation (7), !! is log level of real GDP, and !"!!!!#  is the volatility in the real 
price of oil calculated as the quarterly standard deviation of monthly oil prices. In equation 
(8), we add !!!!# , the NOPI as measured by Hamilton, as a control variable5. The results of 
the F-test of the hypothesis that oil price volatility and its lags do not affect growth rates of 
real GDP can be found in Table 6, where column one and two are for equations (7) and (8) 
respectively. When we do not control for changes in the level of oil prices, we find that oil 
price volatility is significant for several countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand in Asia, 
Brazil and Peru in South America, and all of Central and Eastern Europe with the exception 
of Poland and the Czech Republic. When we introduce net oil price increases as a control 
variable, we find that p-values increase for almost all the countries. Oil price volatility is 
not significant for any country in Asia, Central and South America, and the Middle East 
and Africa, with the exception of Malaysia and Brazil. Oil price volatility does appear to be 
significant for several countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The fall in significance 
indicates that oil price volatility does not contain information independent of oil price 
levels that is useful in forecasting economic growth. This contradicts Ferderer’s finding for 
the US. However, it must be taken into consideration that Ferderer’s dataset includes the 
1970s and 1980s, periods during which oil prices were extremely volatile. If data was 
available for most emerging market countries dating back to the 1970s, we may observe 
different results. 
5.3.2.	  Agriculture	  Price	  Shocks	  
The empirical analyses for the relationship between oil prices and economic activity 
does not reveal a consistent pattern within emerging markets. While the relationship is 
significant for several countries, especially in the last decade, it is unclear if oil price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  We also carry out the test using alternative measures of oil price shocks such as the percentage change in 
real oil prices, but it does not change our results significantly. These results can be found in Table 7.	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shocks impact economic activity as they do for developed countries. An explanation for the 
lack of significance could be that emerging markets have not developed the dependence on 
oil that is found in developed countries. Instead, many of them are dependent on 
agricultural commodities, whether it is for sustenance or export. As shown in Table 3, the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP is significantly higher in emerging markets than in 
developed regions. 
If emerging markets are indeed more dependent on agricultural commodities than on 
oil, we should find that statistical significance is greater for the former than the latter in 
emerging markets. In this section, we carry out empirical tests for the relationship between 
real GDP and agricultural price shocks. The world price of agricultural commodities is 
measured by the World Bank Agriculture Commodity Price Index. This index is calculated 
at the monthly level and converted to a quarterly series by using the mid-month 
observation. We deflate each observation using the US CPI since we want to measure real 
rather than nominal changes in the prices of agricultural commodities. The modified index 
is depicted in Figure 6. We carry out the following regression for each country: 
∆ y! = !! +    !!!∆!!!! + !!!∆!"#!!!!!!!!!!!!                 (9) 
In equation (9), !! is log level of real GDP, and !"#!!!! is the log level of the real 
agricultural index. Table 8 provides the results of the F-test of the hypothesis that 
agricultural price shocks and its lags do not affect real GDP. We find that agriculture price 
shocks are significant for more than half the countries at the 5% level. This is far greater 
than the significance observed for oil price shocks in emerging markets. Since agricultural 
commodity prices are determine at the global level, it is unlikely that emerging markets 
affect these prices. If we accept this as validation for the exogeneity of agriculture price 
shocks, these results illustrate the relative importance of agricultural commodities over oil 
in emerging markets.  
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6.	  Conclusion	  
This paper analyzes the oil price – macroeconomy relationship by applying the two 
leading approaches pioneered by Hamilton and Kilian to emerging markets. While 
researchers have conducted regional and country-specific studies, the major contribution of 
this paper is in applying the net oil price increase model and the structural shocks model to 
emerging markets and capturing the oil price shock of 2007-2008.  
Our main results show that oil price shocks as measured by net increases do not 
produce a consistent effect on emerging markets. While the relationship is significant for 
certain countries, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that net oil price increases do not 
affect economic activity during the full sample for most countries. It is interesting to note 
that most net oil exporters fall into the latter category. When the sample is limited to the 
last decade, it becomes easier to reject the hypothesis for most countries. This is consistent 
with Hamilton’s hypothesis that a period dominated by oil price increases will have higher 
statistical significance. 
Our structural shocks model throws light on the effect of speculative demand for oil 
on real economic activity. The statistical significance of precautionary demand suggests 
that emerging markets are not hedging against speculative movements in real oil prices, 
which could be a result of weak financial markets. The statistical significance of supply 
shocks is not surprising since most of these countries do not have large reserves to fall back 
upon. This differs from the finding in the net oil price increase model. Supply shocks, as 
measured by Kilian’s model allow for more volatility compared to Hamilton’s net oil prices 
increases. This could explain the difference in the findings. The lack of statistical 
significance of aggregate demand shocks is consistent with the divergence in economic 
growth in emerging markets and the rest of the world.  
Testing for oil price volatility reveals that it does not carry information independent 
of movements in oil prices, a finding that is contrary to Ferderer’s results for the US. 
Testing for agriculture price shocks, however, does reveal a statistically significant 
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relationship between movements in agriculture prices and economic activity. This could be 
an opportunity for future research, particularly the interaction between oil price shocks and 
agriculture price shocks.  
Future research could also consider applying other nonlinear measures of oil shocks 
to emerging markets as well as controlling for the effect of changes in country- specific 
exchange rates. Adjusting for the energy specific regulatory environment in each country 
would also add an interesting dimension to the study of oil prices and economic activity. 
While it is difficult to reach a single conclusion about the effect of oil price shocks on 
economic activity in emerging markets, our study does reveal some notable findings about 
hedging against changes in oil prices, differences between net oil importers and exporters, 
and the effect of the 2007-2008 oil price shock.  
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8. Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Data Series 
Source Availability*
Oil Prices
Refiner Acquisition Cost US Department of Energy January 1974 - December 2010
Oil Production
World Crude Oil Production US Department of Energy January 1974 - December 2010
Economic Activity
Real GDP IMF International Financial Statistics Database Varies by country
Baltic Dry Index Bloomberg January 1985 - December 2010
Consumer Prices
US CPI US Department of Labor January 1974 - December 2010
Agriculture Prices
World Bank Agriculture Price Index Global Financial Database January 1974 - December 2010
Sectoral Composition
GDP Sector Shares World CIA Factbook Varies by country
Computed Series
Real Oil Prices Refiner Acquisition Cost * 100/ US CPI
Real Baltic Dry Index Baltic Dry Index * 100/ US CPI
Real Agriculture Price Index WB Agriculture Price Index *100/ US CPI
*Monthly series are made into quarterly series using midmonth observations
Appendix (i)
Table 2: Real GDP Availability for Emerging Markets 
Availability
Asia
 Indonesia Q1:1997 - Q3:2010
 Korea Q1:1960 - Q3: 2010
 Malaysia Q1:1991 - Q3:2010
 Philippines Q1:1981 - Q1:2010
 Thailand Q1:1993 - Q3:2010
Central and South America
 Argentina Q1:1993 - Q3:2010
 Brazil Q1:1995 - Q3:2010
 Chile Q1:1996 - Q4:2009
 Colombia Q1:1994 - Q2:2010
 Peru Q1:1979 - Q3:2010
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic Q1:1994 - Q3:2010
 Hungary Q1:1995 - Q3:2010
 Poland Q1:1995 - Q3:2010
 Russian Federation Q1:1995 - Q3:2009
 Slovak Republic Q1:1993 - Q3:2010
 Turkey Q1:1987 - Q3:2010
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel Q1:1971 - Q3:2010
 Jordan Q1:1992 - Q1:2010
 Morocco Q1:1990 - Q4:2009
Source: IMF IFS Database
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Table 3.1 : Growth Rates of Real GDP
World Bank Projections
Average 
1992-
2001
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2015
 World 3.2 2.9 3.6 4.9 4.5 5.1 5.2 3 -0.6 4.2 4.3 4.6
 Emerging Markets 3.8 4.8 6.2 7.5 7.1 7.9 8.3 6.1 2.4 6.3 6.5 6.7
 Advanced Economies 2.8 1.7 1.9 3.2 2.7 3 2.8 0.5 -3.2 2.3 2.4 2.3
Asia
 Indonesia 3.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.5 6.0 6.2 7.0
 Korea 6.0 7.2 2.8 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.3 0.2 4.5 5.0 4.0
 Malaysia 6.2 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.2 4.6 -1.7 4.7 5.0 5.0
 Philippines 3.3 4.4 4.9 6.4 5.0 5.3 7.1 3.8 0.9 3.6 4.0 4.0
 Thailand 3.8 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.6 5.1 4.9 2.5 -2.3 5.5 5.5 5.0
Central and South America
 Argentina 2.7 -10.9 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.5 8.7 6.8 0.9 3.5 3.0 3.0
 Brazil 2.6 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.1 -0.2 5.5 4.1 4.1
 Chile 6.0 2.2 4.0 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.6 3.7 -1.5 4.7 6.0 4.5
 Colombia 2.7 2.5 4.6 4.7 5.7 6.9 7.5 2.4 0.1 2.2 4.0 4.5
 Peru 3.8 5.0 4.0 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 0.9 6.3 6.0 5.8
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 1.9 3.6 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.1 2.5 -4.3 1.7 2.6 3.5
 Hungary 2.5 4.4 4.3 4.9 3.5 4.0 1.0 0.6 -6.3 -0.2 3.2 3.0
 Poland 4.6 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.0 1.7 2.7 3.2 4.0
 Russian Federation 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 4.0 3.3 5.0
 Slovak Republic 4.6 4.8 5.0 6.7 8.5 10.6 6.2 -4.7 4.1 4.5 4.2
 Turkey 3.0 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.7 5.2 3.4 4.0
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 5.3 -0.7 1.5 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.0 0.7 3.2 3.5 3.7
 Jordan 5.1 5.8 4.2 8.6 8.1 8.0 8.9 7.8 2.8 4.1 4.5 5.5
 Morocco 2.4 3.3 6.3 4.8 3.0 7.8 2.7 5.6 5.2 3.2 4.5 5.0
Source: World Economic Outlook, April 2011
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Table 3.2 : Sectoral Composition of GDP
Agriculture Industry    Services 
 (% of GDP)  (% of GDP)  (% of GDP)
World 5.70% 30.70% 63.60%
Asia
 Indonesia 15% 48% 37%
 Korea 3% 39% 58%
 Malaysia 6% 17% 78%
 Philippines 14% 31% 55%
 Thailand 12% 43% 45%
Central and South America
 Argentina 6% 32% 62%
 Brazil 6% 25% 69%
 Chile 6% 41% 54%
 Colombia 10% 37% 53%
 Peru 6% 33% 53%
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 2% 38% 60%
 Hungary 3% 31% 66%
 Poland 5% 28% 67%
 Russian Federation 5% 35% 61%
 Slovak Republic 3% 36% 62%
 Turkey 9% 26% 65%
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 2% 33% 65%
 Jordan 3% 30% 66%
 Morocco 17% 32% 51%
Source: World CIA Factbook
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Table 3.3: Net Import Position (Thousands Barrels/Day)
2006 2007 2008 2009
World -767.0 -1707.3 -167.1 -62.0
Asia
 Indonesia -157.2 -186.2 -208.3 -245.1
 Korea -2160.2 -2211.2 -2101.3 -2139.4
 Malaysia 197.3 159.7 191.8 139.0
 Philippines -306.6 -289.5 -270.3 -288.4
 Thailand -627.4 -621.1 -604.3 -601.4
Central and South America
 Argentina 258.6 202.3 188.0 214.5
 Brazil -122.0 -72.5 -45.9 55.2
 Chile -261.5 -271.3 -287.3 -286.9
 Colombia 273.9 266.1 314.7 406.8
 Peru -51.8 -50.7 -50.8 -34.6
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic -195.4 -197.5 -199.8 -195.2
 Hungary -124.5 -128.3 -121.2 -120.3
 Poland -464.7 -486.7 -497.8 -501.2
 Russian Federation 6873.9 7181.0 7004.1 7193.7
 Slovak Republic -67.4 -78.6 -75.2 -71.5
 Turkey -633.6 -645.0 -629.3 -526.5
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel -245.8 -237.8 -230.0 -231.0
 Jordan -107.9 -103.4 -94.9 -95.9
 Morocco -176.7 -179.2 -191.1 -200.1
Source: US Department of Energy
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Table 4: Net Oil Price Increase Model*
Full Sample** 2000 - 2009
Full  Sample 
with Seasonal 
Dummies
Asia
 Indonesia 0.971 0.833 0.999
 Korea 0.029 0.047 0.038
 Malaysia 0.201 0.073 0.327
 Philippines 0.755 0.584 0.784
 Thailand 0.139 0.003 0.193
Central and South America
 Argentina 0.999 0.695 0.925
 Brazil 0.514 0.262 0.169
 Chile 0.283 0.011 0.552
 Colombia 0.842 0.671 0.885
 Peru 0.602 0.046 0.518
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 0.370 0.105 0.199
 Hungary 0.003 0.006 0.045
 Poland 0.728 0.652 0.941
 Russian Federation 0.427 0.103 0.449
 Slovak Republic 0.708 0.652 0.579
 Turkey 0.377 0.090 0.527
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 0.350 0.655 0.362
 Jordan 0.233 0.216 0.189
 Morocco 0.432 0.825 0.498
*Reported values are p-values of F-test of NOPI and its lags
**Full sample varies for each country due to limited data availability
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Table 5: Structural Shocks Model*
Precautionary 
Demand
Oil Supply
Aggregate 
Demand
Precautionary 
Demand
Oil Supply
Aggregate 
Demand
Precautionary 
Demand
Oil Supply
Aggregate 
Demand
Asia
 Indonesia 0.002 0.122 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.463 0.481 0.856 0.983
 Korea 0.046 0.243 0.244 0.000 0.004 0.609 0.008 0.023 0.682
 Malaysia 0.018 0.001 0.790 0.000 0.001 0.362 0.274 0.502 0.077
 Philippines 0.003 0.046 0.084 0.001 0.017 0.592 0.031 0.533 0.388
 Thailand 0.004 0.000 0.047 0.001 0.007 0.059 0.638 0.551 0.092
Central and South America
 Argentina 0.001 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.002 0.199 0.970 0.530 0.871
 Brazil 0.167 0.044 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.559 0.848 0.416
 Chile 0.000 0.015 0.227 0.002 0.050 0.579 0.076 0.479 0.384
 Colombia 0.349 0.689 0.118 0.067 0.454 0.192 0.265 0.651 0.079
 Peru 0.000 0.037 0.052 0.002 0.009 0.535 0.439 0.500 0.709
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.225 0.245 0.716 0.480
 Hungary 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.001 0.314 0.276 0.161 0.248
 Poland 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.001 0.420 0.509 0.373 0.818
 Russian Federation 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.045 0.048 0.440 0.146
 Slovak Republic 0.003 0.000 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.046 0.132 0.625 0.425
 Turkey 0.419 0.000 0.840 0.000 0.005 0.464 0.051 0.131 0.077
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 0.002 0.057 0.464 0.011 0.016 0.919 0.022 0.028 0.227
 Jordan 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.006 0.214 0.128 0.948 0.757
 Morocco 0.325 0.553 0.910 0.604 0.687 0.325 0.352 0.516 0.932
*Reported values are p-values of F-test of structural shocks and their lags
**Full sample varies for each country due to limited data availability
Full Sample** 2000 - 2009 Full  Sample with Seasonal Dummies
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Table 6:  Volatility of Real Oil Prices
Volatility
Volatility while 
controlling for 
NOPI
Asia
 Indonesia 0.966 0.940
 Korea 0.190 0.433
 Malaysia 0.010 0.079
 Philippines 0.951 0.973
 Thailand 0.010 0.066
Central and South America
 Argentina 0.855 0.850
 Brazil 0.029 0.057
 Chile 0.106 0.389
 Colombia 0.804 0.751
 Peru 0.709 0.817
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 0.111 0.301
 Hungary 0.000 0.000
 Poland 0.377 0.485
 Russian Federation 0.020 0.095
 Slovak Republic 0.067 0.102
 Turkey 0.009 0.017
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 0.888 0.780
 Jordan 0.803 0.859
 Morocco 0.163 0.342
*Reported values are p-values of F-test of volatility and its lags
**Sample varies for each country due to limited data availability
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Table 7:  Volatility of Real Oil Prices
Volatility
Volatility while 
controlling for % 
Change in Oil Prices
Asia
 Indonesia 0.966 0.898
 Korea 0.190 0.302
 Malaysia 0.010 0.106
 Philippines 0.951 0.913
 Thailand 0.010 0.165
Central and South America
 Argentina 0.855 0.690
 Brazil 0.029 0.026
 Chile 0.106 0.224
 Colombia 0.804 0.743
 Peru 0.709 0.697
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 0.111 0.016
 Hungary 0.000 0.000
 Poland 0.377 0.336
 Russian Federation 0.020 0.013
 Slovak Republic 0.067 0.032
 Turkey 0.009 0.016
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 0.888 0.804
 Jordan 0.803 0.229
 Morocco 0.163 0.248
*Reported values are p-values of F-test of volatility and its lags
**Sample varies for each country due to limited data availability
Appendix (ix)
Table 8:  Agriculture Price Shocks
% Change in Real Agriculture Index
Asia
 Indonesia 0.869
 Korea 0.019
 Malaysia 0.004
 Philippines 0.498
 Thailand 0.010
Central and South America
 Argentina 0.274
 Brazil 0.001
 Chile 0.359
 Colombia 0.406
 Peru 0.870
Central and Eastern Europe
 Czech Republic 0.139
 Hungary 0.005
 Poland 0.451
 Russian Federation 0.008
 Slovak Republic 0.016
 Turkey 0.132
Middle East and North Africa
 Israel 0.845
 Jordan 0.189
 Morocco 0.884
*Reported values are p-values of F-test of agriculture index and its lags
**Sample varies for each country due to limited data availability
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Figure 1: Historical Trends in Oil Prices
Figure 2: Historical Trends in World Oil Production
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Figure 3: Trends in Global Freight Rates
Figure 4: Real Net Oil Price Increases
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Figure 5: Structural Shocks to the Real Price of Oil
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Figure 6: Percent Changes in Agriculture Prices
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